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FICTITIOUS PAYEES IN BILLS OF EXCHANGE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY
PH Lm W. Tn&y~n*
The motive behind the insertion in a bill of exchange of the
name of a fictitious payee is not difficult to understand. Fun-
damentally it is fraudulent, designed to clothe the resulting in-
strument with the appearance of a more substantial credit than
it in fact possesses.' The framer of such a bill says in effect to
the subsequent taker that, in the event of dishonor by the ac-
ceptor, recourse may be had not only on the drawer, but on an
additional party as well. The possibility of raising money on
the instrument is thus greatly enhanced: it becomes three-name
instead of two-name paper.
When a bill drawn in this way has fulfilled its primary pur-
pose and has passed into the hands of a holder in due course,
the position of that holder always has presented a question of
interest to the commercial world. The supposed right of re-
course against the payee has proved to be chimerical; the ordi-
nary right against the drawer is usually, for obvious reasons, of
little actual value. What then is the situation of the holder with
reference to his sole remaining hope, the acceptor? It seems
probable that in the early days of the law merchant the question
was answered in much the same way wherever it arose. In more
recent times however divergent developments in various coun-
tries, coupled with increasing complexity in the underlying
transactions involved, have resulted in a state of considerable
confusion not only in regard to the treatment of the original
question but also with respect to others arising from similar
* A. B., LL. B.; Harvard Law School, Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy.1 Kulp, The Fictitious Payee, (1920) 18 Mich. L. R. 296, 301.
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operations. It is proposed therefore to examine the problem
in some detail, to trace the progress of these varying develop-
ments, and to consider their effect on particular situations that
arise in practice. By means of such a comparative survey an
attempt will be made to determine the nature of existing diver-
sities in the law, and to discover whether any basis can be found
which might result in more uniform treatment. It is manifestly
desirable in the case of an instrument often circulating in more
than one country that uncertainties concerning the rights of
the parties should be reduced to a minimum.
The chief difficulty in the way of the holder's recovery
from the acceptor lies of course in the impossibility of proving
the payee's indorsement. Despite such impossibility it was ear-
ly recognized that under certain circumstances recovery ought
to be allowed. The first English case mentioned in the reports
to raise the point was that of Stone v. Freeland.2 In that case
the drawer of a bill had inserted as payee the name of a firm
with which he had dealings, but which was not intended to come
by the proceeds of the particular bill. The drawer himself in-
dorsed the bill in the name of the payee, and after regular ac-
ceptance it came into the hands of a bona fide indorsee for value
who took it "on the special undertaking of the acceptor, who
expressly promised to pay at the time the holder discounted the
bill.'' 3 It did not appear that the acceptor was aware of the
fraud. In an action by the indorsee against the acceptor the
defendant contended that a proper indorsement was essential
to the plaintiff's title, whereas the plaintiff obviously could not
prove such an indorsement since it was agreed by all the wit-
nesses that the bill was indorsed by the drawer. Said that great
commercial judge, Lord Mansfield: "The intent of the bill was
only to enable Cox (the drawer) to raise money, and the reason
why it was not made payable to the order of Cox was, that there
were other bills at that time made payable to his order; if this
had been also payable to the same order, too many would have
been in circulation at the same time, in the same name, which
would have had the appearance of fictitious credit. Names are
often used of ^persons who never existed. The defendant has
2 B. R. Sittings at Guildhall after Easter Term, 1769. See 1 H.
Blackstone 316, note (a).
3Tatlock v. Harris, 3 T. R. 174, 176 (1789).
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enabled Cox to do this by lending his acceptance, and when he
has by so doing put the bill in circulation, it shall not lie in his
mouth to make an objection that he has nothing to do with it.''4
In protecting the innocent holder of an irregular bill the
effect of this decision was to reflect the mercantile views and
customs of the day. Certainly, contemporary French practice
would have led to the same result. The French commercial code,
promulgated in 1807 and based largely on the ordinance of 1673,
embodied a codification of commercial usage during a period
when there was more than a little truth in the saying that the
law merchant "is universal and one and the same in all the
countries in the world." By the provisions of the code the in-
sertion of the name of a fictitious payee created a supposition
de zonz, and reduced the instrument to the status of a mere
promise. 6 It was admitted however that should such a bill come
into the possession of a bona fide holder the rule could not be in-
voked against him; for "otherwise there no longer would be any
security for third persons who confided in the superficial regu-
larity of the bill.'"7 The commercial importance of ready nego-
tiability was placed above any technical defect in the title of an
honest transferee.$
It would appear therefore that the tendency of the law mer-
chant in the eighteenth century was to protect the holder in due
course of a bill of exchange naming a fictitious payee, and that
this general tendency, based fundamentally on reasons of mer-
cantile desirability, found its way into the common law under
circumstances that justified the raising of an estoppel. The
proposition was that anyone who purported to give circulation
to a bill regular on its face ought not to be permitted to invoke
4 See note (2).
Davies, Concerning Impositions, 17 (1656).
" Code de commerce, Art. 112, read as follows in its original form:
"Sont reputees simples promesses toutes lettres de change contenant
supposition soit de nom, soit de qualites, soit de domicile, soit des
lieux d'ou elles sont tirees, ou dans lesquels elles sont payables."
'Cohendy et Darras, Code de Commerce Annote, 648 (1903):
"Mais l'exception de supposition ne peut pas etre invoquee, malgre la
generalite des termes de notre article, contre le porteur de bonne foi:
car autrement il n'y aurait plus de securite pour les tiers qui ont eu
conflance dans la regularite exterieure du titre, ce qui entraverait
singulierement la circulation des lettres de change." See to the same
effect Lyon-Caen et Renault, Traite de Droit Commercial (5th ed.,
1925), Vol. IV, Sec. 478.
8Nouguier, Des Lettres de Change (4th ed., 1875), Sec. 292.
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an actual irregularity against an innocent purchaser relying on
its apparent validity.9
Some twenty years after the decision of Lord Alansfield in
Stone v. Freeland,10 came the first of a series of cases that were
to have a profound influence in shaping the later law in Eng-
land and in the United States. These cases arose out of the
bankruptcy in 1788 of Livesey, Hargreave & Co., a Manchester
partnership, and were based accordingly on related underlying
facts. This firm, apparently in common with many others dur-
ing the same period, had been in the habit of kiting bills of ex-
change on a large scale in order to provide funds for current
needs." In order to facilitate subsequent negotiation the names
of fictitious payees were inserted in the bills, which were drawn
by arrangement on various drawees who sometimes were paid
substantial commissions for lending their credit. 12 Indorse-
ments purporting to be those of the payees were written in by
a clerk in the firm's office. "This traffic had gotten to such a
height that in Livesey's house a book of fac sinziles was actually
kept, from which the clerks used to take such name for payee
as they thodight proper, and indorse the name; and when the
necessities of the house were very great, they inserted any name
that their imagination could suggest.' 3 In a typical transac-
tion the bills thus completed were discounted with a banking
house in Manchester whose acting partner was on intimate terms
with the drawers and in extending discount facilities relied
wholly on their ability to make good without reference to the ac-
ceptors.' 4 It is noteworthy that the fictitious character of the
payees was known both to the acceptors and to the discounting
banker.
9 Stone v. Freeland, supra, note 2.
l0See note (2).
n See Bennett v. Farnell, 1 Camp. 129, 131 note (1807), and Ex
parte Royal Bank of Scotland, 2 Rose 197, 201 note (b) (1815), from
which it appears that the firm was launching these bills to the extent
of nearly a million sterling a year. In Hunter v. Jeffery, Peake's
Add. Cas. 146 (1797), it is stated that one acceptor alone often had
from £1500 to £2000 a day of the firm's bills. As to the prevalence
of the practice, see the remarks of Lord Chief Baron Eyre and of
Heath, J., in Gibson v. Minet, 1 H. Blackstone 568 (1791), at pages
617 and 623 respectively.
12 Heath, J., as cited supra.
"Hunter v. Jeffery, supra, at page 148.
"I., at page 147.
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The net result of such a transaction was that a subsequent
purchaser of one of these bills obtained an instrument regular
on its face, but in fact issued purely on speculation, -without
reference to any actual commercial operation, and with an en-
tirely deceptive appearance of added credit derived from the
payee's indorsement.
In Tatlock v. Harris,15 the first of these cases to come before
the courts, the holder was allowed to recover from the acceptor
on counts for money paid and money had and received. 16 This
case contained no count stating the bill to be payable to bearer.
The later cases in the series included such counts however, and
in permitting recovery accordingly the courts formulated a
proposition which may be stated as follows: When a bill of ex-
change is drawn in favor of a fictitious payee and both
drawer and acceptor are privy to the fiction, the bill may be
treated as payable to bearer in an action by a bona fide holder' 7
against the acceptor.' 8 Knowledge on the part of the acceptor
might be shown by evidence in regard to other bills, even though
unrelated. 19
This proposition was grounded in the fraud of the acceptor
in wittingly giving currency to fictitious paper. "If therefore
they have accepted a bill," said Baron Hotham in the House of
Lords, "which they knew was so framed as to be incapable of
being proved in the shape it bore, they shall nevertheless be held
to their undertaking to pay it, though it be presented to them
in another, because they themselves have induced such neces-
sity; for it is a known rule of law, that no man shall take advan-
tage of his own wrong."' 20 With the conclusion of this series
of cases we accordingly find a variant on the former doctrine.
Under the rule established in Stone v. Freeland2' an acceptor
who actively misrepresented to a prospective holder the nature
of a bill drawn and indorsed in the name of a ficitious payee
-3 T. R. 174 (1789).
ie Id., at page 182.
' Thus in Hunter v. Jeffery, supra, a holder with knowledge was
not allowed to recover. See also Hunter v. Blodgett, 2 Yeates 480
(Penn., 1799), where lack of knowledge was averred in the declaration.
I Vere v. Lewis, 3 T. R. 182 (1789); Gibson v. Minet, 1 H. Black-
stone 569 (1791), affirming Minet v. Gibson, 3 T. R. 481 (1789).
1' Gibson v. Hunter, 2 H. Blackstone 288 (1794).
"Gibson v. Minet, supra, at page 584.
zSee note (2).
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was not permitted as against such a holder to deny the validity
of the indorsement; and his own ignorance of the fiction was
immaterial. In accordance with the decisions in the later cases
an acceptor who was in fact aware of the fiction was held on the
bill without reference to any direct dealings with the holder;
and the holder was allowed to recover as on a bill payable to
bearer.
From one point of view the difference between the two sit-
uations merely illustrated the distinction in English law between
estoppels based on active and on passive misrepresentations. 22
From another angle however the trend thus given to the law
was more far-reaching. In the first place, the emphasis placed
on the knowledge of the acceptor and the treatment of the bills
as payable to bearer marked a definite departure from the views
held on the continent, where such knowledge was immaterial
and where bearer bills were regarded with disfavor. 23 In the
second place, the same two factors paved the way, as we shall
see, for subsequent confusion both in England and in the United
States.
By the close of the eighteenth century therefore the process
of translating the law merchant into the common law had re-
sulted in breaking down the fictitious payee transaction into two
clearly distinguishable situations, each susceptible of treatment
in a particular way, and in the handling of one of those situa-
tions in a manner which not only did not reflect but could not
be reflected in the corresponding law of the continent. Even in
England and in the United States moreover the matter was far
from clarified. In an American case, where the acceptor was
unaware of the fiction, the court said that "the rule with regard
to fictitious payees has only been carried to this extent, that the
bona fide holder of such a bill, ignorant of the facts, may re-
"Ewart, Estoppel, Chap. viii (1900).
2 Bearer bills were in use in France during the seventeenth cen-
tury, and were expressly permitted by Article 20 of the Ordinance of
1673. They were prohibited by edict in 1716, ostensibly because they
favored usury, but actually because of possible competition with bills
issued by the newly created royal bank. This prohibition soon was
withdrawn, but bearer bills continued unpopular throughout tha
eighteenth century, and were finally forbidden altogether by the Code
de Commerce. For a discussion of the matter, see Levy-Bruhl, Histoire
de la Letre de Change en France aux XVII et XVIII Siecles (1933),
76-78, 207-211.
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cover against an acceptor who knew that the payee was a ficti-
tious person. The use of such names has been, indeed, highly
censured, and an acceptance, without knowledge by the acceptor
of the fictitious character of the bill, would, it seems, give no
remedy and be completely void.'"24 This unequivocal statement
disregards entirely the possibility of a situation such as that ex-
emplified in Stone v. Freeland.25 In a later English case, on the
other hand, where recovery was allowed against an acceptor
without knowledge on the basis of estoppel, the judges neverthe-
less indicated that they would have been prepared to regard the
bill as payable to bearer had it been necessary.2 6 It is notewor-
thy too that the leading English and American writers of the
nineteenth century failed to distinguish clearly between the two
types of cases. 2 7
In this state of the authorities, the English Bills of Ex-
change Act was passed in 1882, and provided that "where
the payee is a fictitious or non-existing person the bill may be
treated as payable to bearer.''28 "The object of the Bill was
to reproduce, as exactly as possible, the existing law on the sub-
ject in a codified form."' 29 Not even the framers of the bill
however were sure whether they had reproduced the existing
law in the provision quoted. The original intention had been
to insert a clause working out in detail the results of the cases;
the clause actually incorporated was substituted in committee.30
"This sub-section," observed Chalmers, is perhaps new law."31
As evidence to the contrary, however, he then pointed to the
case of Phillips v. Irn Thurn.32 *Whatever their doubts as to the
existing law therefore, and in spite of their silence on the point,
it is clear that the framers intended by this provision to sweep
away any requirement of knowledge on the part of the acceptor.
2IMcCall v. Corning, 2 La. Ann. 409, 414 (1848).
-'See Note (2).
2' Phillips v. Im Thurn, L. R. 1 C. P. 463 (1866). Cf. the obser-
vations of Lord Ellen borough in the note to Bennett v. Farnell, 1 Camp.
iSOc (1S07).
1' See for example Byles, Bills of Exchange, 68 (1857); Story, Bills
of Exchange, Sec. 56 (1860); Parsons, Notes and Bills, 32, 33 (1865);
and Daniels, Negotiable Instruments, Secs. 136-138 (1876).
,Sec. 7, sub-sec. (3).
Chalmers, Bills of Exchange Act (1882), Introduction, page iv.
' Chalmers, Bills of Exchange (10th ed., 1932), 26.
C halmers, Bills of Exchange (3d ed., 1887), 19.
-2L. R. 1 C. P. 463 (1866).
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To quote again from Chalmers: "What the Act has done is to
declare that the mere fact that a bill is payable to a fictitious
person is not of itself a bar to proceeding against parties who
were ignorant of that fact.' 33  If this be a true construction
the effect of the Act is to perpetuate neither the doctrine of
Stone v. Freeland34 nor that of the subsequent series of cases,
but the curious intermingling of the two approved by the judges
in Phillips v. Im Thurn.35
The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law later adopted in
the United States was based on the English Act.30  The word-
ing of the corresponding section however is different. The law
provides that "the instrument is payable to bearer when it is
payable to the order of a fictitious or nonexisting person, and
such fact was known to the person making it so payable.' 37
The American law thus requires specifically that the irregular-
ity should be known to the drawer, but like the English Act
is silent on the point of knowledge by the acceptor. Other dif-
ferences between the two statutes also may be noted. The Amer-
ican law, for instance, speaks of the bill as payable to order, but
the English refers merely to the payee. This difference is due to
the fact that in compromising with Scottish law the English
Act departed from the ordinary rule of the common law which
required definite words of negotiability,38 whereas the Ameri-
can law made no such departure.3 9 Again, it may be observed
that the English provision is that "the bill may be treated as
payable to bearer," where the American states more definitely
that "the instrument is payable to bearer," a variation with
possible implications.
French law in the meantime had remained unchanged, for
the numerous amendments to the commercial code did not affect
the provision in regard to a supposition de noM. 40 Many other
Chalmers, Bills of Exchange (4th ed., 1891), 22.
31 See note (2).
-L. R. 1 0. P. 463 (1866).
"BRrannan, Negotiable Instruments Law Annotated (4th ed.,
1926), ix.
' Sec. 9, 3.
C halmers, Bills of Exchange (10th ed., 1932), 30.
U. N. I. L., Sec. 126, provides that a bill must be payable "to
order or to bearer."
"The amendment of 1894 abolished the provisions in regard to
suppositions of domicile and place.
FICTITIOUS PAYEES
countries with commercial codes moreover had based these codes
directly on that of France, so that with the opening of the twen-
tieth century a large part of the mercantile world had laws
which embodied the French view of bills of exchange designat-
ing a fictitious payee.4 1 In Germany, however, and in those
countries which followed the German system,42 another way of
regarding such bills had appeared. Laws regulating bills of
exchange had not been adopted by any concerted action among
the German states until the middle of the nineteenth century. 43
This comparatively late development brought with it a new con-
ception of the bill of exchange which differed radically from the
French and English theories.4 4 The resulting law, re-enacted
in the German Weehselordnimng of 1908, contained no specific
reference to the case of a fictitious payee, but merely provided
generally that the name of the payee must be mentioned.4 5
German authorities were agreed that under this provision the
fictitious character of the payee named was immaterial; no
rights or obligations with respect to such a payee could arise,
but the validity of the bill was not affected, and a holder in due
course had the usual rights against the other parties.4 6 The
German law was thus more liberal than the French in recogniz-
ing the initial effectiveness of the bill, but reached substantially
the same result in protecting the innocent holder.
In 1930 an international conference was held at Geneva in
the hope of bringing about greater uniformity in laws of the
continental types relating to bills of exchange.47 The law under
Including France and her colonies, twenty-eight countries are in-
cluded in this group by Meyer in his Welt-WVechselrecht (1909) 25.
See also Potu, L'Unification du Droit Relatif a la Lettre de Change
(1916) 48.
42 Eighteen countries are included in this group by Meyer, supra,
at page 26. See also Pott, supra, 49.
' For an account of this development in Germany see Jencken,
Compendium of the Laws on Bills of Exchange (1880), 14-18.
"For a comprehensive discussion of the French, English, and
German theories, see Potu, supra, chap. ii.
'r Article 4 provided that the bill must contain "der Name der
Person oder die Firma, an welche oder an deren Order gezahlt werden
soil."
". Otaub, Kommentar zur Wechselordnung (11th ed., 1926), 4S and
49. See also Grunhuit, Wechselrecht (1897), Vol. I, 346-347.
"170 Law Times 15 (1930). For the background of the conference
see Oecderlin, Les Tentatives d'Unification du Droit de Change,
(Societe suisse de Drolt International, Publication No. 24). See also
Hudson and Feller, International Unification of Laws Concerning Bills
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consideration was based largely on the German, but clarified the
silence of the German statute by providing that the insertion of
a fictitious name should have no effect on the obligations of
other signers.48 This law so far has been given effect in sixteen
countries, most of them, with the exception of France, countries
that already followed the German system.4 9
At the present time therefore the original French view of
the treatment of bills in favor of a fictitious payee is reflected
only in those countries which had based their laws on the sub-
ject on the former provisions of the French commercial code ;50
but a similar result in safeguarding the holder in due course is
reached in countries following either the earlier German law51
or the Geneva convention. 52 In all these countries the essential
simplicity of the law merchant in seeking the free circulation
of negotiable paper has been preserved in. this particular con-
nection with a minimum of juristic pother. In England and
in the United States, on the contrary, such were the technical
difficulties of absorption into the common law that the basic
idea often received less notice than the legal muniments which
were devised to support it; while the statutes intended to be
declaratory of the absorption differ in their phraseology, and
are otherwise of dubious import. Our next task then is to ex-
amine the details of these divergencies more closely, and to con-
sider their effects in the application of the law to specific
situations.
Let us turn first to the effect of knowledge of the fiction by
the several parties concerned in the transaction.
With respect to the holder there is little difficulty. The
decision in Iunter v. Jeffery53 that a holder with knowledge
could not recover was declaratory of a fundamental principle in
refusing aid to any other than a holder in due course. French
of Exchange, 44 Harv. L. R. 333 (1931), and Balogh, Critical Remarks
on the Law of Bills of Exchange, 9 Tulane L. R. 165 (1935), 10 Tulane
L. R. 36 (1935).
18This provision is reproduced in Article 7 of the present German
Wechselgesetz, effective from June, 1933, and in Article 114 of the
amended Code de Commerce of France, as decreed October, 1935.
'For the complete list see League of Nations Publications,
A.6(a).1936.Annex 1.(V)., also cited as Legal, 1936.V.4, page 76 and 77.
,See Note (41).
,' See Note (42).
12See Note (49).
OPeake's Add. Cas. 146 (1797).
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and German writers alike have emphasized that the benefits of
the law can be invoked only by a porteur de bonne foi, by a gut-
glaubige Indossatar..4 English and American writers have taken
the same view,- 5 and the assurance of Lord Herschell that there
is no change in this respect under the present lawes is scarcely
needed. It should be noted however that neither the English
nor the American statute refers to the point specifically, and
that the effect accordingly is to read into the acts a provision
which is not expressly there. Under the circumstances the jus-
tification for such a procedure cannot be doubted. 57
"We come next to the question of knowledge on the part of
the drawer of the instrument. In the ordinary situation where
the drawer is giving the appearance of regularity to an irregu-
lar bill in order to raise money on it, such knowledge would be
present as a matter of course, and was in fact present in all the
early cases. The question is, whether this knowledge is an in-
dispensable requisite, or whether circumstances may arise in
which it becomes unimportant. It already has been noted that
the English act is silent on the point, but that the American pro-
vides expressly for knowledge on the part of the "person mak-
ing it so payable.' "s Is this added requirement mere surplus-
age, or does it indicate a real difference in the meaning of the
two statutes? The answer must depend on the definition to be
given to "fictitious", and must take into account the fact that
both the English and the American statutes include the word
"nonexisting" as well.
In the older cases no distinction had been taken between
fictitious and nonexisting payees. In some instances the payees
were real firms or persons but not actually intended to receive
payment ;5 in others the names used were of persons once living
SNouguier, Des Lettres de Change (4th ed., 1875), Sec. 292;
Beda, ide, De la Lettre de Change (2d ed., 1877), Sec. 128; Lyon-
Caen. et Renault, Traite de Droit Commercial, (5th ed., 1925), Vol. IV,
Sec. 47S; Grunlz.t, Wechselrecht (1897), Vol. I, 347.
I See for example Chitty, Bills of Exchange (Sth ed., 1833), 173
and 179; Story, Bills of Exchange (4th ed., 1860), Sec. 56.
r In Bank of England v. Vagliano, (1891) A. C. (H. L.) 107, 154.
See also Chalhers, Bills of Exchange (10th ed., 1932), 27, and Kulp,
The Fictitious Payee, (1920) 18 Mich. L. R. 296, 309.
" Bills of Exchange Act (1882), Sec. 97 (2); Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law, Sec. 196.
" Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, Sec. 9, 3.
"' Stone v. Freeland, svpra, note 2.
K. L. J.-2
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but since dead;60 and in still others they were imaginary.0 '
The same was true in French and German law. 62 "Fictitious"
had been used in connection with all these situations, and it was
plain enough that it could continue to be so employed. It was
equally clear however that as a matter of derivation the word
imported an additional connotation. 3  Said Lord Herschell in
Bank of England v. Vagliano :64 "Whenever the name inserted
as that of payee is so inserted by way of pretence merely, with-
out any intention that payment shall only be made in conform-
ity therewith, the payee is a fictitious person within the meaning
of the statute, whether the name be that of an existing person,
or of one who has no existence." 65 If "fictitious" thus emerges
as a word that may be applied both to existing and to nonexist-
ing payees, it emerges also as an expression to be linked with a
particular state of mind on the part of the person designating
the payee: intent is determinative. As Lord Buckley pithily
remarked, "There can be no action without an actor, and no
fiction without a feigner. " 6 , "Fictitious" necessarily connotes
knowledge on the part of the person responsible for the fiction.
To that extent therefore any express requirement of knowledge
is superfluous, for, if a payee is fictitious, knowledge of the fic-
tion is inherent in the language used.
It becomes correspondingly evident that the specific inclu-
sion of "nonexisting" in both the English and American stat-
utes is no idle mention.67 A fictitious payee may be either ex-
isting or nonexisting; it does not follow that a nonexisting payee
is inevitably fictitious. Although "fictitious" imports a mental
60 Bennett v. Farnell, supra, note 11.
"Gibson v. Minet, Id.
WAlauzet, Commentaire du Code de Commerce (3d ed., 1879), Vol.
IV, Sec. 1257; Grunhaut, Wechselrecht (1897) Vol. I, 346-347.
""Fictitious", derived from the Latin fingere, is synonymous with
"feigned", which has the same derivation. Properly speaking there-
fore, fiction is a manifestation of pretence, and presupposes a person
who consciously is putting something forward as being that which it
is not.
61 (1891) A. C. (H. L.) 107, 153.
"Ibid.
6In Macbeth v. North and South Wales Bank, (1908) 1 K. B. 13,
22 (affirmed by the House of Lords in (1908) A. C. 137).
670 ha mers, Bills of Exchange (10th ed., 1932), 26, points out that
although the word might seem superfluous, it was intended to cover
such a case as that of Ashpitel v. Bryan, 32 L. J. Q. B. 91 (1863),
where a bill was made payable to a dead person.
FICTITIOUS PAYEES
attitude, "nonexisting" relates to a matter of fact: a thing
either exists or does not exist, and intention is helpless to alter
the point.0 8 The insertion of the word "nonexisting" without
any qualifications accordingly provides for a situation independ-
ent of any state of mind.
Under the English act then, if a bill is drawn in favor of a
payee who has no existence in fact it is immaterial whether or
not the payee was intended to be a real beneficiary. 9 The mere
nonexistence of the payee is enough to bring the bill within the
operation of the statute. This state of the English law goes
beyond the actual cases prior to the act, in which the drawers
invariably had knowledge, but it is not inconsistent with them,
and it is definitely in harmony with French and German law,
where the knowledge of the drawer never has been an essential
element.70
Under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, on the
other hand, the express requirement of knowledge on the part
of the person making the bill payable applies equally whether
the payee is fictitious or nonexisting. In this country therefore
the fact of nonexistence must be coupled with knowledge. 71
'8Thus in Macbeth v. North and South Wales Bank, (1908) 1 K. B.
20, 22, Lord Buckley said: "Existence or non-existence of a particular
person is a question of fact, not relevant to anybody's mind or inten-
tion." Of. Kulp, The Fictitious Payee, (1920) 18 Mich. L. R. 296, 297.
OClutton v. Attenborough, (1897) A. C. 90 (H. L.), affirming(1895) 2 Q. B. 707 (C. A.). A payee who is an existing person how-
ever is not fictitious if the drawer of the bill considers the transaction
a real one: Vinden v. Hughes, (1905) 1 K. B. 795; North and South
Wales Bank v. Macbeth, (1908) A. C. 137 (H. L.), affirming (1908)
1 K. B. 13 (C. A.); Town and County Advance Co. v. Provincial Bank
of Ireland, (1917) Ir. R. 421. But ct. London Life Assurance Co. v. Mol-
son's Bank, 8 Ont. L. R. 238 (1904), criticized by Falconbridge in 28
Can. L. T. 542, and in 43 Can. L. J. 225.
" The use of the words imaginaire and erdichtete respectively In
the present French and German codes [see note (48):] indicates a
conception similar to that invoked by the English use of "fictitious".
Both codes also include a general provision in regard to signatures not
binding the persons purporting to have signed which would cover
the case of a payee non-existing but not fictitious.
7 'United Cigar Stores Co. v. American Raw Silk Co., 184 N. Y. App.
Div. 217, 171 N. Y. Supp. 480 (1918), affirmed in 229 N. Y. 532, 129
N. E. 904 (1920); Jordan Marsh Co. v. National Shawmut Bank, 201
Mass. 397, 87 N. E. 740 (1909). This result reflects the attitude of
American courts prior to codification: Shipman v. Bank of N. Y., 126
N. Y. 318, 27 N. E. 371 (1891); Armstrong v. National Bank, 46 Oh.
St. 512, 22 N. E. 866 (1889). Just as in England a payee who is an
ex'sting person is not fictitious if the drawer of the bill considers the
transaction a real one: Seaboard National Bank v. Bank of America,
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The result is substantially the same as if the word "nonex-
isting" had been omitted from the law, for no one who wit-
tingly inserts in a bill the name of a nonexistent payee can pos-
sibly intend the designation to be effective in accordance with
its apparent terms. In insisting on knowledge in all cases the
American law is thus less inclusive than the English, and less
in accord with French and German practice.
The final answer to our original question in regard to the
necessity for knowledge on the part of the person making the
bill payable therefore is an affirmative one under the law of this
country; but, in cases where the question is not one of mere non-
existence, such knowledge should be regarded under English
law rather as a test of the fictitious character of the payee, and
not in any event as an indispensable requirement.
In the preceding discussion reference has been made indis-
criminately and perhaps somewhat loosely to knowledge on the
part of the drawer, or of the person making the bill payable.
Until recently no more precise phraseology would have been
necessary, for the facts of the earlier cases were not such as to
offer many difficulties in this connection. Increasingly compli-
cated situations however have introduced new factors that make
further refinements imperative. The bill is signed by one per-
son on the inducement of another; the person signing is acting
for some one else; a confiding signer puts his name to a blank
bill and entrusts it to another; the bill is signed by co-signers;
the signature of the drawer is forged. In circumstances where
knowledge is important, either as a test or because it is a requi-
site, in what precise person must the knowledge reside in order
that the resulting bills should be deemed payable to a fictitious
or nonexisting person? Only the American law is vocal on the
point, providing that the knowledge must be on the part of "the
person making it so payable." 72
In the first of the various situations enumerated some per-
193 N. Y. 26, 85 N. E. 829 (1908); Jordan Marsh Co. v. National Shaw-
but Bank, supra; and conversely such a person is fictitious if not in-
tended to receive payment: Norton v. City Bank & Trust Co., 294 Fed.
839 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923); American Hominy Co. v. National Bank of
Decatur, 294 Ill. 223, 128 N. E. 391 (1920); Snyder v. Corn Exchange
National Bank, 221 Penn. 599, 70 Atl. 876 (1908). For the use of a
business name, impersonation, and other distinguishable situations, see
Kulp, The Fictitious Payee, supra, note 1.2Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, Sec. 9, 3.
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son procures the signature of another as drawer to a bill desig-
nating a payee known to the procurer to be fictitious or nonex-
istent. In the usual case a fraudulent agent or employee with au-
thority to prelare bills for signature takes advantage of his po-
sition to draw up a bill apparently regular with the intention of
profiting by its actual irregularity; after obtaining a proper
signature as drawer he writes in the purported indorsement of
the ostensible payee and secures payment. On such facts it
would seem to be plain enough that, whatever the knowledge of
the fraudulent employee may be, the payee is not fictitious so
long as the actual signer regards the transaction as genuine.
Without reference to its previous state of preparation the bill is
created by the person who signs it as drawer, and if fiction re-
quires a feigner it is logical to conclude that the feigning must
be on the part of the person who brings the bill into existence
as a living instrument. The designation of the payee is an empty
form until rendered effective by the signature of the drawer.
This view of the matter has been accepted in England in a case
where the fictitious character of the payee was in question. In
Vizden v. Hztghes7 3 a confidential clerk whose duty it was to
prepare cheques for signature made out a number of cheques in
the names of actual customers, but with the fraudulent inten-
tion of misappropriating the proceeds. The employer signed
the cheques in the belief that they covered real transactions,
whereupon the clerk wrote in the indorsements of the payees
and obtained payment. It was held that the payees were not
fictitious on the ground that the drawer "had every reason to
believe, and he did believe, that the cheques were being drawn
in the ordinary course of business for the purpose of the money
being paid to the persons whose names appeared on the face of
those cheques.' '74
A similar result would seem to follow even more readily
under the express wording of the American law that the knowl-
edge must be by "the person making it so payable." Certainly
it is the actual signer, not the scrivener, who makes the bill pay-
able, and most courts have held accordingly that the knowledge
of a fraudulent agent or employee is not enough to satisfy the
"' (1905) 1 K. B. 795.
71 Id., at page 802.
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statute, whether the agent prepares the bill for signature75 or
whether he merely induces its preparation and signing.7 6 Some
courts however have toyed with the idea that under such cir-
cumstances the knowledge of the fraudulent employee should be
imputed to the employer, with the result that the maker of the
bill may be chargeable with knowledge which he does not pos-
sess. 7 7 This line of reasoning is ill founded, and has been gen-
erally criticized.7 8 It is contrary to established principles that
the knowledge of an agent should be imputed to the principal he
is attempting to defraud.7 9
A somewhat different question is presented when the agent
or employee has authority not only to prepare instruments for
signature but to sign them as well. Under such circumstances it
obviously is an easy matter for the dishonest employee to issue
irregular bills without any knowledge whatever on the part of
the principal in whose name he signs. Is the knowledge of the
agent alone sufficient to make the payee fictitious? The question
has not arisen in England. In this country courts have tended to
answer in the affirmative, usually by imputing the knowledge of
the agent to the principal.80 In addition to being open to the ob-
, United States Cold Storage Co. v. Central Mfg. District Bank,
343 Ill. 503, 175 N. E. 825 (1931); Gutfreund v. East River National
Bank, 251 N. Y. 58, 167 N. E. 171 (1929); National Surety Co. v. Na-
tional City Bank, 184 N. Y. App. Div. 771, 172 N. Y. Supp. 413 (1918);
Shipman v. Bank of New York, 126 N. Y. 318, 27 N. E. 371 (1891).
; Jacoby v. Kline Bros., 241 N. Y. App. Div. 470, 272 N. Y. Supp.
871 (1934); New York v. Bronx Trust Co., 261 N. Y. 64, 184 N. E. 495
(1933); American Sash & Door Co. v. Commerce Trust Co. 332 Mo. 98,
56 S. W. (2d) 1034 (1933); United Motor Car Co. v. Mortgage &
Securities Co., 13 La. App. 385, 128 So. 307 (1930); Caledonian Insur-
ance Co. v. National City Bank, 208 N. Y. App. Div. 83, 203 N. Y.
Supp. 32 (1924); National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Mellon National
Bank, 276 Penn. 212, 119 Atl. 910 (1923); City of St. Paul v. Merchants
National Bank, 151 Minn. 485, 187, N. W. 516 (1922); American Ex-
press Co. v. People's Savings Bank, 192 Ia. 366, 181 N. W. 701 (1921);
Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Home Savings Bank, 180 Calif. 601, 182
Pac. 293 (1919); Robertson Banking Co. v. Brasfield, 202 Ala. 167, 79
So. 651 (1918); Jordan Marsh Co. v. National Shawmut Bank, 201
Mass. 397, 87 N. E. 740 (1909); Seaboard National Bank v. Bank of
America, 193 N. Y. 26, 85 N. E. 829 (1908).
,'Jones v. People's Bank Co., 95 Ohio St. 253, 116 N. E. 34 (1917);
Equitable Life Assurance Society v. National Bank of Commerce, 181
S. W. 1176 (Mo. App., 1916).
"Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law Annotated (4th ed., 1926),
98. See also note in 27 Ill. L. R. 65.
"'Mechem, Outlines of Agency (3d ed., 1923), Sec. 491.
8 Childs v. Empire Trust Co., 54 Fed. (2d) 981 (C. C. A. 2d,
1932); American Hominy Co. v. National Bank of Decatur, 294 Ill. 223,
128 N. E. 391 (1920); Bartlett v. First National Bank, 247 Ill. 490, 93
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jection noted above,81 this disposal of the matter does not seem
to take due account of the facts. In the sort of case outlined
before, the authority of the agent ceased with preparation; in
the present situation the agent actually completes and emits the
instrument. His is the effective arm, although he writes in the
name of another. Here then is a feigner who is responsible not
only for the fiction, but also for the creation of the bill. What
more could be needed in order that the payee should be regarded
as fictitious? In a recent Kentucky case8 2 an agent with author-
ity to sign the name of a corporation to cheques drew seven such
cheques in favor of an existing association not intended by him
to receive the proceeds, and procured payment for himself by
writing in the indorsements. The corporation was unaware of
the transaction. It was held nevertheless that the cheques were
payable to bearer, the court saying: "The words 'the person
making it so payable,' given their ordinary meaning, refer to
the person who actually drew the bill, whether he be the nominal
maker or not." 8 3 This view of the matter, without resort to du-
bious imputations, seems to accord both with reason and with
common sense, to meet the requirements alike of language and of
law. It exemplifies moreover the general proposition that where
knowledge is to be sought, it should reside in the person who
brings the bill into existence as an effective instrument.
It may be that the person inserting the name of the payee,
instead of being an agent with authority to sign or to prepare
for later signature, is one to whom the bill already signed has
been entrusted in blank. In Ranciw San Carlos v. Bank of Ita74j
Association8 4 the superintendent of a corporation was in the
habit of giving a bookeeper signed blank cheques from time to
time for the purpose of meeting current bills. On one such oc-
casion the bookkeeper filled in the cheque for $10,000 and named
as payee another employee of the corporation whose indorsement
he subsequently forged. The conclusion of the trial court that
N. E. 337 (1910); Snyder v. Corn Exchange National Bank, 221 Penn.
599, 70 Atl. 876 (1908); Phillips v. Mercantile National Bank, 140
N. Y. 556, 35 N. E. 982 (1894).
'See note (79).
10Mueller & Martin v. Liberty Insurance Bank, 187 Ky. 44, 218 S.
W. 465 (1920).
"Id., at page 48.
" 69 Calif. App. 656, 231 Pac. 1012 (1932).
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the resulting instrument might be treated as payable to bearer
was upheld on the ground that a cheque is actually "made" by
the person who completes it, and that in this case the bookkeeper
iather than the signer was the real drawer and "the person mak-
ing it so payable.' '3 It is at least arguable that the person who
puts the finishing touches to a blank bill is the maker of it.s6 On
the other hand, it is admittedly difficult to see any real distinc-
tion between a situation where the fraudulent employee fills up
the bill before obtaining the signature of the drawer, and one in
which he secures the signature first and fills up the bill later. In
both cases the actual signer is the employer, and the same induce-
ments may be used in both to procure the signing. It seems un-
reasonable that a mere change in the order of procedure should
be allowed to work contrary results. Yet we have noted that if
the filling up is done prior to the signing, the actual signer must
be aware of the fiction.87 The truth of the matter wouldappear
to be that in both instances alike the person ultimately responsi-
ble for the existence of the bill is the one who signs as drawer;
for although the person filling in the blanks may complete the
bill, it is none the less the signer who has made such completion
possible. It is submitted therefore that knowledge of the fiction
should lie in the signer if the resulting bill is to be regarded as
payable to a fictitious payee.8 8
A further problem is presented in the event of co-signers. If
one such signer is fraudulent and frames an irregular bill, is his
knowledge alone sufficient to make the payee fictitious? This
was the situation in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Wells PFargo
Bank and Union Trust Co.s9 In that case one of the officers of a
corporation was charged with the duty of settling claims on ac-
count of returned goods, discounts, and replacements, by issuing
cheques which required, in addition to his own, the signature of
another official. The fraudulent officer devised fictitious trans-
actions on account of which he drew seventy cheques totaling
1M., at page 659.
" Note for example the language of the Uniform Negotiable In-
struments Law, Sec. 14, and of the Bills of Exchange Act, Sec. 20, in
speaking of the conversion into a bill of a blank signed paper; the in.
ference being that the person filling up the paper brings it into exist.
ence as a negotiable instrument.
See note (75).
See note in (1935) 23 Calif. L. R. 523, 525.
81 Calif. App. (2d) 694, 37 Pac. (2d) 483 (1934).
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$100,000. These cheques were signed for the corporation by
himself and by a co-signer who was unaware of any fraud but
relied sometimes on supporting papers that had been faked and
in other instances merely on the signature of his associate. Re-
versing the decision of the lower court, it was held that these
cheques were payable to bearer on the ground that when the con-
duct of co-signers indicates that they are functioning as mere
automata the intent of the fraudulent participant is controlling.
Said the court: "The only specific intent with reference to such
checks is that of the person who within the scope of his authority
gives them life." 9
The general situation thus resembles that in Mueller & Mar-
tin v. Liberty Insurance Bank,91 where a distribution was taken
between nominal and actual signers, but with the difference that
here there are two actual signers instead of only one. The ques-
tion then is how the principle of the former case can be applied
under such circumstances. The California court replies by say-
ing in substance that when there are several actual signers and
a nominal signer, there nevertheless may be only one effective
signer, and the intention of this last should govern.
Several considerations may be noted in regard to such a con-
clusion. In the first place, the commercial purpose of requiring
for corporate bills more than one signer is obviously to protect
the corporation against the possible fraud of one alone. If the
corporation after all is to suffer when such fraud occurs there-
fore, the main object of the precaution is defeated. 92 In the sec-
ond place, it seems altogether futile in a mercantile arrangement
of so usual a nature to speculate on the relative importance of
the two signatures. The plain fact is that one is just as vital as
the other to the effectiveness of the instrument, and to attempt
to weight them by inquiring into the other duties of the signers,
by examining the routine character of the signing, or by asking
which signature was last affixed, is to juggle with intangibles
that would be better avoided. 93 Finally moreover, the effect of
Id., at page 496.
'187 Ky. 44, 218 S. W. 465 (1920).
See note in (1935) 15 B. U. L. R. 289, 296.,
g See note in 83 Univ. of Penn. L. R. 678 (1935). Of. note in
(1935) 48 L. R. 846.
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permitting the fraudulent signature to control the other is vir-
tually to disregard the latter entirely.
With these considerations in mind it would seem that a more
logical application of the Kentucky rule would be to require
knowledge equally of all co-signers. Such a solution would be
more in accord with the mercantile purpose behind the practice,
and would obviate the injection of elements difficult of exact
ascertainment. Furthermore, if the law on the one hand places
importance on the knowledge had by the maker of a bill, and on
the other permits a plurality of makers, it surely is a reasonable
assumption that the first requirement also may be understood in
the plural.9 4
In addition to the possibilities already enumerated it may
happen that the signature of the drawer is forged, so that strictly
speaking there is no bill of exchange at all. Since there is also
no real drawer, it is a question where to find a repository for the
knowledge necessary in order to regard such an instrument as a
bill payable to a fictitious payee. The leading case involving
such a situation is that of Vagliano Brothers v. Bank of Eng-
land.95 In that case a fraudulent clerk procured the acceptance
of his employer to bills which he had forged in all particulars.
The name used as drawer was that of a firm which often drew
bills on the employer, and the name designating the payee was
that of a house frequently named as payee in these genuine bills.
The clerk then completed the fraud by forging the indorsement
of the ostensible payee, and obtained payment at maturity from
the acceptor's bank. It was eventually held by a majority in
the House of Lords9" that the payees were fictitious, and that the
instruments might be treated as bills of exchange payable to
bearer. The initial difficulty in regard to the non-reality of the
bills was overcome by raising an estoppel against the acceptor,
who was thus precluded from denying that they were genuine.97
Since the payee unquestionably was not intended by the forger
to be an actual beneficiary, and since the forger and the pseudo
14 See note in (1935) 15 B. U. L. R., supra.
16 (1891) A. C. 107, reversing the decision of the Court of Appeal
in 23 Q. B. D. 243 (1889), which upheld that of Charles, J., in 22
Q. B. D. 103 (1888).
"Five Lords so held in (1891) A. C. 107.
' Ia., at page 120.
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drawer were identical, there was knowledge on which the ficti-
tious character of the payee might be predicated. Said Lord
Herschell on the point: "If, in the present case, Vucina had him-
self drawn the bills and inserted the name of C. Petridi & Co. as
payees, as a mere pretense without intending any such persons
to receive payment,... they would have been bills whose payee
was a fictitious person, and I do not think they can be regarded
as any the less so, in view of the circumstances under which the
name of C. Petridi & Co. was inserted." 98 A like result may be
reached with even greater ease under the phraseology of the
American law, for if there is an instrument which may be treat-
ed as a bill of exchange, the forger assuredly is the maker of it.99
We come now to the question of knowledge of the fiction on
the part of the acceptor. In French and German law this point
was never of any consequence; the general policy of protecting
the innocent holder which was behind the treatment of the spe-
cific situation made such knowledge of no account. We already
have noted however that the particular conditions under which
this policy was given effect in English law made knowledge of
paramount importance in cases where the incidental estoppel
was based on passive misrepresentation. °0 0 We have noted also
that it was the avowed intention of the framers of the English
Bills of Exchange Act to do away with any requirement that the
drawee should be aware of the fiction. 1° 1 This result was not
accepted by the English courts without some qualms. In Vag-
liano Brothers v. Bank of England,10 2 where the acceptor was
the defrauded party and was completely unaware of the fiction,
a majority of the Court of Appeal, upholding the view expressed
by Charles, J., in the court below,' 0 3 stated that "if the ob-
Id., at page 154.
First National Bank v. U. S. National Bank, 100 Ore. 264, 197
Pac. 547 (1921); United States v. Chase National Bank, 241 Fed. 535(S. D. N. Y., 1917), affirmed in 250 Fed. 105 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918), and
in 252 U. S. 485, 40 S. Ct. 361 (1919); Trust Company of America v.
Hamilton Bank, 127 N. Y. App. Div. 515, 112 N. Y. Supp. 84 (1908).
Attention should be called to the fact that individual peculiarities in
the laws of some States relate directly to the question of fraudulent
agents and employees: Il. Rev. St. (Cahill, 1933) c. 98, Sec. 29 (3);
Idaho Code Ann. (1932), See. 26-109 (3).
201 See pages 206 and 207.
" See page 209.
223 Q. B. D. 243 (1889).
3 22 Q. B. D. 103 (1888).
KENTUcKY LAW JOURNAL
ligations of the acceptor are in question, and the acceptor is the
person against whom the bill is to be so treated, fictitious must
mean fictitious as regards the acceptor, and to his knowledge.
Such an interpretation is based on good sense and sound com-
mercial principle.' 01 4 In the House of Lords opinions also
were divided, but a majority disagreed with this conclusion of
the Court of Appeal on the ground that "this is to add to the
words of the statute and to insert a limitation which is not to be
found in it or indicated by it.' 10 5 Said the Earl of Selborne:
"It seems to me neither unjust nor unreasonable that the rights
and liabilities of third parties should in such a case depend upon
the facts rather than upon an inquiry into the acceptor's state
of mind."16 Added Lord Macnaghten: "The section appears
to me to have effected a change in the law in the direction of the
more complete negotiability of bills of exchange-a change in ac-
cordance, I think, with the tendency of modern views and one
in favour of holders in due course, and not, so far as I can see,
likely to lead to any hardship or injustice."' 10 7 In the end
therefore any former requirement as to knowledge on the part
of the drawee was deemed definitely to have been abolished by
the English Act. This result has at least two desirable conse-
quences: it sweeps away the confusion engendered by the ap-
plication of estoppels based on differing factors, and it again
brings the law more closely in harmony with that of the conti-
nent. It is worth noting moreover that the statement of Lord
Macnaghten covers only part of the truth; in emphasizing more
complete negotiability, and in favoring holders in due course,
the change is fully as much a reversion to original principles as
a reflection of modern tendency.
Here once more a like result would seem to follow a forti-
ori under the American statutes, for the express requirement
of knowledge on the part of the maker might be said to indicate
an intention to disregard any such factor in other cases. Fur-
thermore, a fiction requires but one feigner, and it seems both
unnecessary and undesirable to scrutinize the mental back-
ground of every person whom it is sought to charge on the in-
'o,23 Q. B. D. 243, 261 (1889).
'o' (1891) A. 0. 107, 146.
16 Id., at page 130.
-10Id., at page 161.
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strument. The argument has been advanced however that
knowledge was necessary under the common law in order to base
an estoppel, and that in the absence of express reference to the
point such knowledge must continue to be requisite.' 0 8 This
argument is fallacious. We already have seen that, in cases
where estoppel is based on active misrepresentation, knowledge
is unimportant.10 9 It is preferable to maintain, with the House
of Lords,1 10 that the omission of any reference to the matter
was intentional."'
There remain for discussion two problems which are a di-
rect consequence of the peculiar development of the law in Eng-
land and in the United States. We have seen that the original
treatment of bills in favor of a fictitious payee was grounded in
the general policy of protecting the innocent holder. We have
noted further that the circumstances under which the matter
arose in England led to its handling on the basis of estoppels,
the ultimate effect of which was to preclude the acceptor from
denying that the bill was payable to bearer. Still, however, the
only rights in question were those of a holder in due course, for
in the commercial transactions of the time it was such a holder
who ordinarily sought redress. The specific treatment would
have been impossible on the continent, but the result was as yet
much the same. It was not until after codification that the more
extensive possibilities of the clauses "may be treated as payable
to bearer" and "is payable to bearer" began to appear. With
changing commercial conditions, and particularly with the in-
creasing use of cheques, questions connected with bills payable
to fictitious persons were by no means limited to those arising
between holder and acceptor; more often than not an unsuspect-
ing drawee now found occasion to assert against a defrauded
drawer his right to pay out money on a cheque which actually
bore a forged indorsement.
, First National Bank v. Northwestern National Bank, 152 Ill. 296,
38 N. E. 739 (1894). Contra, Trust Company of America v. Hamilton
Bank, 127 N. Y. App. Div. 515, 112 N. Y. Supp. 84 (1908). The view
of the Illinois case is discussed and approved by Greeley in (1908) 3
Ill. L. R. 331, but with particular reference to bills with forged
drawers' signatures.
" I Stone v. Freeland, supra, note 2; and see note (22).
n9 Bank of England v. Vagliano Brothers, (1891) A. C. 107.
" See discussion of the point by Kulp, Fictitious Payee, (1920)
18 Mich. L. R. 296, 310.
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By whom then might the instrument be treated as payable
to bearer? Said Lord Herschell: "A bill, within the sub-sec-
tion, may be treated as payable to bearer by any person whose
rights or liabilities depend upon whether it be a bill payable to
order or to bearer. '"112 It accordingly was held that where a
bill payable to a fictitious person and bearing the genuine ac-
ceptance of the drawee was payable at the acceptor's bank, the
bank was justified in making payment on a forged indorsement
to the perpetrator of the fraud. 113 The reasoning involved in
this decision is broad enough to cover as well the case of a
drawee bank maintaining its right to debit the account of a
drawer in connection with a cheque payable to a fictitious per-
son, although the precise question has not arisen in England." 4
In the United States however the wording of the Ameiican law
dissipates any possible doubt in such situations by providing
flatly that the bill "is payable to bearer. '"" 15
This all-inclusive extension seems at first glance far removed
from an original proposition that aimed primarily at safe-
guarding a holder in due course. The particular treatment
would be, we have seen, impossible under other systems of law" 0
The result reached moreover, of permitting a payment to be made
to a fraudulent person, although it could have been enforced
only by a bona fide holder, savors somewhat of inconsistency.
Further consideration nevertheless shows that an entirely dis-
tinct principle is involved in such a situation. Under continen-
tal legal systems the drawee never has been bound to verify the
genuineness of the indorsements on the bill.- 7 In the case of a
Bank of England v. Vagliano Brothers, (1891) A. C. 107, 154.
1131Id.
n4 In North and South Wales Bank v. Macbeth, (1908) A. C. 137,
the depositor was allowed to prevail against the bank because the
payee was not fictitious. For a Canadian case in which the right of
the bank was upheld, see London Life Assurance Co. v. Molson's Bank,
8 Ont. L. R. 238 (1904).
"5 Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, See. 9, 3.
"5Supra, note (23).
n" Art. 145 of the former French Code de Commerce provided that
"celui qui paie une lettre de change a son echeance et sans opposition
est presume valablement libere." A drawee who paid on a forged in-
dorsement in good faith accordingly was free from any liability. For
discussions of the doctrine, see Youguier, Des Lettres de Change (4th
ed., 1875), Secs. 333-339, and Bedarride, De la Lettre de Change (2d
ed., 1877), Secs. 395 and 396. Art. 36 of the German Wechselordnung
stated that "die Echtheit der Indossamente zu prufen, ist der Zahlende
nicht verpflichtet." For comment on this provision, see Staub, Kom-
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bill designating a fictitious payee therefore, the holder in due
course on the one hand was protected by the policy favoring
free negotiability, while the drawee making payment on the bill
was safeguarded on the other by the separate policy which en-
abled him to do so without reference to the validity of the in-
dorsements. Two independent principles were concerned, each
bringing its own consequences in the specific aspect of the mat-
ter under consideration. It thus appears that, albeit acciden-
tally, the actual effect of the English and American statutes in
regard to fictitious payees is to relieve the drawee in such cases
from his ordinary responsibility respecting indorsements, and
to that extent to approximate the continental law.1" s The seem-
ing inconsistency just adverted to accordingly disappears: two
distinct relationships are involved, between the acceptor and
the holder, and between the drawer and the drawee; it is not
to be expected that the position of the drawee should be the
same in both.
Since the bills under discussion are payable to bearer gen-
erally, in the latter relationship as well as in the former, the
possibility of the drawer's negligent conduct in giving currency
to such an instrument is in most instances of slight importance.
The drawee is protected in any event by his ability to make pay-
ment as on a bearer bill. 1 9 There nevertheless are situations
in which the carelessness of the drawer conceivably should play
a weightier role. In Defiance Lumber Co. v. Bank of Califor-
nia,120 for example, a fraudulent time clerk by preparing time
cards in fictitious names induced his employer to issue pay
cheques which he himself cashed after writing in the indorse-
ments of the ostensible payees. Here obviously was no case of
a fictitious payee, for in the eyes of the employer the transac-
mentar zur Wechselordnung (11th ed., 1926), 152. Art. 137 of the Code
de Commerce as amended, and Art. 40 of the Wechselgesetz now pro-
vide in equivalent terms that the drawee is bound to verify the regu-
larity of the order of the indorsements, but not the signatures of the
Indorsers.
1" It is noteworthy that Sec. 60 of the Bills of Exchange Act takes
a further step in the same direction by relieving bankers who pay in
good faith in the ordinary course of business from any duty to verify
the signatures of payees or subsequent indorsees. There is no cor-
responding provision in the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law.
"I Bills of Exchange Act, Sec. 7 (3), Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Law, Sec. 9, 3.
1' 180 Wash. 533, 41 Pac. (2d) 135 (1935).
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tions .were genuine. In an action by the employer against the
drawee bank however, payment of the cheques by the latter was
upheld on the ground that it was the proximate result of the
drawer's own conduct. Said Beals, J., speaking for a majority
of the court: "We are clearly of the opinion that appellant, by
its careless and negligent conduct of its own business, permitted
its own employee to perpetrate upon it a gross fraud, and that
it cannot now recoup its losses by passing the burden thereof
to respondent. "121 We are not concerned here with a detailed
examination of the doctrine of estoppel by carelessness. 122 It
is sufficient to note that even in cases where the designated
payee is neither fictitious nor nonexistent, the conduct of the
drawer still may remove from the drawee his usual burden of
verifying an indorsement. The possibility exists similarly in
situations where the instruments in question have been signed in
blank,123 and where there are co-signers.12 4 The substantial
justice of such a result is clear; the net effect is to bring the
English and American law nearer to the continental in yet an-
other type of case.' 25
To summarize the main features of the comparative devel-
opment that has been depicted is to emphasize the influence of
mercantile custom in the ultimate shaping of the law. The orig-
inal treatment of bills of exchange in favor of fictitious payees
fell naturally enough within a commercial policy aiming at free
negotiability, but was absorbed into the common law in a way
that stressed legal ways and means rather than objectives and
that led inevitably to confusion. Subsequent codification in
England and in the United States removed the difficulties at-
LId., at page 548.
'2 For a discussion of the subject, see Rwart, Estoppel, Chap. IX
(1900).
'1 Edelen v. Oakland Bank for Savings, 39 Calif. App. Rep. 302, 178
Pac. 737 (1918). Cf. Phillips v. A. W. Joy Co., 114 Me. 403,-96 At. 727
(1916), and S. Weisberger Co. v. Barberton Savings Bank, 84 Oh. St.
21, 95 N. E. 379 (1911).
2'Pannonia Building & Loan Association v. West Side Trust Co.,
93 N. J. L. 377, 108 Atl. 240 (1919). Cf. Tri-Bullion Smelting & De-
velopment Co. v. Curtis, 186 N. Y. App. Div. 613, 174 N. Y. Supp. 830
(1919).
1 Negligence on the part of the drawer is immaterial in French
and German law, since the drawee is safeguarded by the general provi-
sion relieving him from any duty in regard to verifying indorse-
ments; the only exception is in the case of payments made in bad
faith: See note (117).
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tendant on the application of estoppels by providing a flat rule,
and resulted incidentally in bringing the law of the two coun-
tries more closely in accord with that of France and of Germany
in two directions, first in regard to the treatment of a holder in
due course in his relations with the acceptor, and secondly by
relaxing in certain particulars the ordinary obligation of the
drawee in verifying indorsements. As the matter stands at pres-
ent therefore, the outstanding obstacle in the way of complete
reconciliation is the specific requirement in the American law of
knowledge on the part of the maker in the case of nonexisting
payees, and local peculiarities adopted in some individual states.
By routes however divergent the various countries discussed
have arrived at a point where substantial accord appears to be
a possibility in dealing with most of the situations arising out of
a fictitious payee transaction.
K. L. J.-3
